The Fedz - Print 2 Earn
  • Stability Under Stress: The Fedz's Innovative Approach
  • Improving Upon Previous Attempts
  • Tokenomics
  • FUSD - The Fedz Synthetic Dollar
    • Private Liquidity Pool
      • Example: Private Liquidity Pools & Open Market Liquidity Pools
      • Example: Navigating Market Fluctuations in "The Fedz" Ecosystem
  • sbFUSD, Staking, and Printing FUSD: The Stability Engine of TheFedz
  • The Fedz Elements and Rules
    • How to Join The Fedz
    • The Fedz Game
    • Rule Book
  • The Fedz: A New Approach to Studying Bank Runs in Field Conditions
    • Invitation to Researchers
  • Background on Bank Stability
    • Academic Research and The Fedz Context
      • Kiss et al. (2012) on Deposit Insurance and Observability
      • Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) on Deposit Insurance and Market Discipline
      • Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) on Market Discipline
      • Madies (2006) on Partial Deposit Insurance
      • Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) on Observability and Insurance
      • Preventing (panic) bank runs Hubert J. Kiss 2022
      • William A. Branch eta al (2022) on Noise and Sunspots in Financial Models
      • Andolfatto (2017) on Preventing Bank Runs
      • Diamond and Dybvig meet money: Are deposit contracts efficient after all? (D. Rivero, H. Rodrıguez)
      • Starr and Yilmaz (2007) on Social Networks
      • Jacklin (1987) on Investment Technology
      • Leveraging Axelrod's (1984) Game Theory for Enhanced Cooperation in The Fedz
    • Key hypothesis & Research Terms
      • Dynamic Reward System (After-Tax) in The Fedz Ecosystem
      • Isolated Decision-Making in The Fedz Ecosystem
      • Decentralized Clearinghouse and Governance in The Fedz Ecosystem
      • Decentralized Bailout in The Fedz Ecosystem
      • Privileged Access and Sustained Stability in The Fedz
    • Contributions to Future Research
    • TBD - ZK for keeping the NFT player choice and deal with it together at the end of the round.
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  • Previous Algorithmic Stablecoins: Terra-Luna and Basis
  • 1:1 Backed Stablecoins: USDT and USDC
  • Decentralized Over-Collateralized Stablecoins: MakerDAI and LUSD

Improving Upon Previous Attempts

Competitor Comparison: How The Fedz Stands Out in Decentralized Finance

PreviousStability Under Stress: The Fedz's Innovative ApproachNextTokenomics

Last updated 12 months ago

Previous Algorithmic Stablecoins: Terra-Luna and Basis

Previous attempts at creating algorithmic stablecoins, such as Terra-Luna and Basis, have highlighted both the potential and the challenges of this innovative approach. Terra-Luna utilized a dual-token system where the value of Terra was maintained through the minting and burning of Luna. However, this mechanism proved vulnerable to extreme market conditions, leading to significant instability and eventual collapse. Similarly, Basis aimed to maintain its peg through an algorithmic expansion and contraction of supply but faced regulatory hurdles and operational challenges. These examples demonstrate the fragility and complexity inherent in algorithmic stablecoin systems, which The Fedz aims to improve upon with more robust mechanisms.

1:1 Backed Stablecoins: USDT and USDC

In the stablecoin market, 1:1 backed stablecoins like USDT (Tether) and USDC (USD Coin) are prominent examples. These stablecoins operate by backing each issued token with an equivalent amount of assets, theoretically maintaining a one-to-one ratio with the US Dollar. However, these assets are not entirely composed of US dollars; instead, they include a mix of short-term and long-term US debt. This means that while they aim to provide stability, they are not as capital efficient as FUSD. Their reliance on debt instruments introduces a layer of fragility, as significant financial pressure leading to mass withdrawals could reveal vulnerabilities in their backing assets.

Decentralized Over-Collateralized Stablecoins: MakerDAI and LUSD

Over-collateralized stablecoins like MakerDAO’s DAI and Liquity’s LUSD require high over-collateralization to function effectively. These stablecoins necessitate users to deposit assets worth significantly more than the value of the stablecoins they receive, often exceeding 150% collateralization rates. While this approach aims to ensure stability and mitigate risk, it also introduces inefficiencies and capital constraints. Moreover, in times of extreme market volatility, the value of the collateral can plummet, triggering liquidations and making the system fragile. This high collateral requirement limits their usability and flexibility, posing challenges to scalability and efficiency compared to FUSD.

The Fedz Research Lab